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Background: HAVNet is an international laboratory net-
work sharing sequences and corresponding metadata 
on hepatitis A virus in an online database. Aim: We give 
an overview of the epidemiological and genetic data 
and assess the usability of the present dataset for geo-
graphical annotation, backtracing and outbreak detec-
tion.  Methods:  A descriptive analysis was performed 
on the timeliness, completeness, epidemiological 
data and geographic coverage of the dataset. Length 
and genomic region of the sequences were reviewed 
as well as the numerical and geographical distribu-
tion of the genotypes. The geographical signal in the 
sequences was assessed based on a short common nt 
stretch using a 100% identity analysis.  Results:  The 
9,211 reports were heterogeneous for completeness 
and timeliness, and for length and genomic region of 
the sequences. Some parts of the world were not rep-
resented by the sequences. Geographical differences 
in prevalence of HAV genotypes described previously 
could be confirmed with this dataset and for a third 
(1,075/3,124) of the included sequences, 100% iden-
tity of the short common sequence coincided with an 
identical country of origin.  Conclusion:  Analysis of 
a subset of short, shared sequences indicates that 
a geographical annotation on the level of individual 
countries is possible with the HAVNet data. If the cur-
rent incompleteness and heterogeneity of the data can 
be improved on, HAVNet could become very useful as 
a worldwide reference set for geographical annotation 
and for backtracing and outbreak detection.
Introduction
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) belongs to the 
genus  Hepatovirus  within the  Picornaviridae  family. 
There is only one recognised serotype of HAV. Based 
on partial genomic sequences, three human genotypes 
(I to III) have been identified, with distinct geographical 
distribution [1,2].
The virus causes acute liver disease and is transmit-
ted through ingestion of contaminated food and water 
or through direct contact with a contagious person. 
Both infection and vaccination lead to lifelong immu-
nity. Incidence is strongly correlated with socioeco-
nomic indicators and access to safe drinking water, and 
has substantially decreased in recent decades with 
improvements in sanitation and hygienic conditions, 
combined, in some regions, with childhood vaccination 
[3,4]. The level of endemicity of HAV was estimated for 
the 21 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) world regions, 
with four levels distinguished: (i) high, ≥ 90% of the 
population have immunity by the age of 10 years; (ii) 
intermediate, ≥ 50% have immunity by the age of 15 
years; (iii) low, ≥ 50% have immunity by the age of 30 
years; (iv) very low, < 50% have immunity by the age of 
30 years [5-7]. In high-endemicity areas, nearly all chil-
dren become infected at a very young age, and most 
adults are protected.
High endemicity is still present in some developing 
countries, mostly in Africa, and in the Middle East, Asia 
and Central and South America [5,6].
In very low-endemicity countries, groups at increased 
risk for hepatitis A are mainly international non-vacci-
nated travellers, men who have sex with men (MSM), 
and people who use drugs intravenously [8]. Apart from 
these risk groups, there is a general risk of infection 
through the consumption of contaminated, imported 
foods. Due to the globalisation of the food market, 
this risk is increasing [9-11]. Countries producing and 
exporting fruit, vegetables and shellfish products 
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may have a higher level of HAV endemicity than the 
countries importing the products. As the virus is very 
stable in the environment, and the dose required to 
infect susceptible humans is low, an outbreak is likely 
to occur when contaminated food is introduced into a 
large, susceptible population [12]. Added to this risk is 
the fact that the virus is excellently preserved in fro-
zen, ready-to-eat products [13], which may be shipped 
globally.
Due to the long incubation period for hepatitis A (15–50 
days), linking and traceback of food-borne clusters or 
outbreaks of HAV are not straightforward. Given the 
stability of HAV, molecular typing and comparison of 
HAV strains can help to identify outbreaks and link 
cases, particularly in outbreaks with foods that have 
been dispersed over a wide geographic region. This 
requires international sharing of combined epidemio-
logical and laboratory data [14].
Over 7,000 HAV sequences (including simian 
sequences) are available in the open-sequence reposi-
tory of GenBank [15], but structured registration of 
epidemiological data such as source or country of 
infection is lacking. In 2010, the international hepa-
titis A virus laboratory network, HAVNet, was set up 
and a database of HAV sequences combined with epi-
demiological data was implemented, starting from the 
database used in the former European project, the 
Food-borne viruses in Europe Network [16-18]. Here, 
we describe the data currently available in the HAVNet 
database. The completeness of the epidemiological 
data is evaluated and the available sequences are ana-
lysed for length, genomic region and genetic diversity. 
These results are used to assess the usefulness of the 
present dataset for geographical annotation, backtrac-
ing and outbreak detection.
Methods
HAVNet network, database and typing tool
The HAVNet network consists of virologists from univer-
sities and public health institutes [19] using an online 
password-protected database platform. The database 
is used on a give-and-take basis which involves signing 
a confidentiality agreement. Besides the sequences, a 
set of background data fields is available (e.g. sam-
pling date, age, sex, HAV vaccination status, day of 
onset of disease, suspected country of infection, sus-
pected transmission route and implicated food). As 
not all laboratories are able to submit epidemiologi-
cal data, the only compulsory fields are case identi-
fier and year of sampling. The platform offers online 
analysis and visualisation tools such as the Basic Local 
Alignment Search Tool (BLAST), phylogeny and a geo-
graphical analysis tool. HAV sequences available in the 
Table 1
Hepatitis A virus sequences reported to HAVNet by participating countries and reported to GenBank, based on year of 
sampling, pre-2010–2017 (n = 9,211)
Source of reports
Sampling year
Total
Unknown < 2010 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
GenBank 2,051 3,305 395 113 265 470 147 38 1 0 6,785
Australia 0 0 16 13 23 30 36 23 0 0 141
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 4
Czech Republic 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
France 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 52
Germany 0 2 0 6 13 17 34 11 47 32 162
Hungary 0 178 7 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 192
Ireland 0 0 0 0 1 32 5 15 2 0 55
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 7
Latvia 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
The Netherlands 0 697 212 98 82 78 88 56 63 19 1,393
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4
Norway 0 0 0 0 2 26 0 0 0 0 28
Spain 0 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
Sweden 0 43 0 0 0 3 11 29 15 3 104
United Kingdom 0 0 0 4 2 3 3 58 0 0 70
Total 2,051 6,532 630 236 389 665 330 246 129 54 9,211
HAVNet: hepatitis A virus Network.
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public domain (GenBank [15]) are added to the dataset 
on a regular basis. If not available as standard in the 
GenBank record, the sampling date and geographic ori-
gin of the sequences are supplemented after searching 
the GenBank record and associated publications.
Standardised genotyping of all sequences in the data-
base is realised through linkage with the newly devel-
oped HAV genotyping tool [20] through a web service. 
This tool was developed using building blocks from the 
open source REGA HIV-1 subtyping tool [21], analogous 
to the norovirus and enterovirus typing tools [22]. The 
typing algorithm starts with a BLAST analysis of the 
query sequence against a reference set of sequences 
from viruses in the family  Picornaviridae, resulting in 
identification as HAV, and assigning coordinates of 
the genomic region of the query sequence, relative to 
the public reference sequence (NC_001489) [23]. The 
second step is a phylogenetic analysis of the query 
sequence compared with a subset of HAV reference 
sequences, to assign the genotype, with profile align-
ment, construction of phylogenetic trees and boot-
strap validation. The genotyping result is subsequently 
stored in the HAVNet database. A download of the com-
plete HAVNet dataset on 27 February 2017 was used 
for the analyses, including the additional and manually 
supplemented GenBank entries.
Descriptive analysis of the HAVNet dataset
A download of the complete HAVNet dataset on 27 
February 2017 was used for the analyses, contain-
ing 9,211 reports, with 9,783 sequences (572 reports 
reported two sequences, from two different genomic 
regions), of which 2,426 reports were submitted by 
18 HAVNet members and 6,785 were retrieved from 
GenBank (Table 1). The earliest reported year of 
Figure 1
Representation of the genomic coordinates of hepatitis A virus sequences in the HAVNet database relative to the reference, 
1957–2017 (n = 9,783)
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HAVNet: hepatitis A virus Network.
The x axis represents the position of each sequence relative to the reference HAV genome NC_001489. Each horizontal grey line is one 
sequence from GenBank, each black line a sequence reported by a HAVNet member. The vertical red lines demarcate major typing regions: the 
end of the 5’ non-coding region (position 735), the VP3/VP1 junction (between positions 2,207 and 2,208) and the VP1/2A junction (between 
position 3,107 and 3,108).
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sampling for the GenBank sequences was 1957, and for 
the HAVNet sequences it was 2000.
The completeness of the dataset was scored for infor-
mation on sampling date, suspected geographical 
origin of the virus, possible source of infection, vac-
cination status and hospitalisation. For the subset of 
HAVNet reports for which a complete sampling date 
was available, and which were submitted after 2010 
(the year in which the HAVNet database was started 
and historical datasets were uploaded) the reporting 
lag was calculated. Geographic distribution of geno-
types was compared with previously published data 
[1,2]
Analysis of 100 nt sequence types for 
geographical signal
For the analysis of the geographical signal, they were 
evaluated for their lengths and coordinates relative to 
the reference sequence. Based on these findings, a 
target region for the analysis was chosen encompass-
ing the majority of the sequences in the database, 
while remaining of sufficient length to have suitable 
discriminatory power in the subsequent analysis.
The subset of sequences included in this analysis com-
prises all entries of human HAV in the HAVNet data-
base reporting the most likely geographical origin of 
the infection. Only sequences from endemic countries 
were included.
The large heterogeneity of the sequence regions in the 
dataset resulted in the choice of a short target region 
of only 100 overlapping nt. With such short sequences, 
a reliable phylogenetic cluster analysis is not possi-
ble. Thus, a very basic classification method was cho-
sen in which sequences were grouped on the basis of 
100% identity within this 100 nt region, i.e. identical 
sequence-type. Minimum group size was arbitrarily set 
at three. Groups of two were left out because despite 
thorough curation, duplicate sequences in the HAVNet 
dataset cannot be excluded due to the two sources 
(HAVNet and GenBank) of the sequences.
Because of the overrepresentation of some countries 
in the database, for each sequence-type group the 
geographic information was analysed by comparing 
the frequencies of the suspected country of origin for 
sequences in that group with the geographic distri-
bution of the entire dataset. The p value thus repre-
sents the probability of finding this frequency based 
on chance. P values below 0.05 were considered sta-
tistically significant. Calculations were performed 
and  Figures 1,  2  and part of  Figure 3  were composed 
using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, 
Washington, United States, 2010).
Results
Descriptive analysis of the HAVNet 
epidemiological data
The 2,426 reports submitted by HAVNet members 
were evaluated for epidemiological data. Of these, 972 
(40%) were reported with a possible source of infec-
tion (Table 2). Of the reports with a reported source 
of infection, 508 (52%) reported travel to an endemic 
country, and 77 (8%) reported a possible food-borne 
source, of which 16 reported shellfish, 18 fresh or fro-
zen fruit, and 43 other or unknown food. Fewer reports 
held other epidemiological data: only 282 (12%) reports 
from HAVNet members recorded the vaccination sta-
tus, and 79 (3%) recorded whether or not the patient 
was hospitalised (data not shown).
For HAVNet reports with complete sampling dates and 
reported after 2010 (start of the present HAVNet data-
base platform), the reporting lag was computed: of the 
850 reports included, the median reporting lag was 94 
days (min = 0 days, max = 1,282 days), with large differ-
ences per country and no clear trend over the years.
Figure 2
Specification of the use of the 9,760 human hepatitis A 
virus sequences in the analyses
9,760 sequences
5,300
3,124
2,461
2,358 1,3311,075
1: All sequences of human origin.
2: From 96 endemic countries.
3: Covering the specified 100nt region, including 92 endemic 
countries.
4: 100% identical to ≥ 2 others (= sequence type group).
5: Significantly associated to one of the 181 sequence type groups, 
including 74 countries.
6: In 145 groups from a single GBD region.
7: In 122 groups from a single country, including 29 countries.
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Genetic data
The 9,783 sequences in the database ranged in length 
from 60 nt to around 7,500 nt, the length of the com-
plete genome. The genomic region covered by the 
sequences is shown in Figure 1.
The two genomic regions most widely used for geno-
typing, the VP1/2A region and the VP3/VP1 region 
[1,24], were predominant in the dataset. A limited set 
of complete genomes was available. These were mainly 
downloaded from GenBank.
Of the 9,211 reports, 8,657 (2,394 reported by HAVNet 
members, 6,263 retrieved from GenBank) could be 
typed as human HAV genotypes by the typing tool. 
Twenty three were of genotype V, which is not found 
in humans, so these were excluded from the over-
view in Table 3, as were the sequences for 531 reports 
which could not be typed by the typing tool. Of these, 
50% (267) were sequences from the 5’ non-translated 
region, while only 9% of the typed sequences were from 
that region. One was a hepatitis B virus sequence. In 
general, the sequences which could not be genotyped 
were shorter than the typed sequences, with a median 
length of 196 nt, vs 332 nt for the typed sequences. 
They tended to cluster clearly with one genotype (I, II 
or III), but could not reliably be assigned to one of the 
subtypes within each genotype and thus remain unas-
signed due to the present setup of the typing tool.
The majority (7,127, 82%) of the 8,657 reports in the 
download were genotype I (88.5% for HAVNet, 80.0% 
for GenBank) (Table 3). In the HAVNet dataset, the pro-
portion of I.A was smaller than in the GenBank dataset: 
55.9% vs 62.7%, and for I.B vice versa: 32.6% vs 17.3%. 
The next most common genotype was III.A, with 19.2% 
in the GenBank sequences, and 11.3% for HAVNet. 
Genotype II was very rare, with only 34 reports in total. 
All 24 III.B sequences in the download dataset were 
retrieved from GenBank and had sampling dates before 
1990 (data not shown).
Geographical distribution of hepatitis A virus 
genotypes
For 5,300 of the 9,760 sequences (54.3%) in the 
dataset, the endemic country from which the virus 
originated was present (Figure 2).  Figure 3  shows the 
distribution of the human HAV genotypes over the GBD 
world regions with low to high endemicity [2]. The geo-
graphical distribution of genotypes is in concordance 
Figure 3
Distribution of human hepatitis A virus genotypes over the endemic Global Burden of Disease regions, pre-2010–2017 
(n = 4,863)
Latin America 
(1,113)
Central Europe 
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Sub-Saharan
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HAVNet: hepatitis A virus Network.
This map is based on the suspected origin of the virus as reported by HAVNet members or determined from the GenBank record or associated 
publications.
The number of sequences per region are shown in parentheses. Reports from regions of very low endemicity have been omitted.
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with the findings in 1992 by Robertson et al. [1]. 
Genotype I.B is predominant in sub-Saharan Africa, I.A 
in South and Central America and III.A in south Asia. In 
North Africa and the Middle East both I.A and I.B can 
be found. Based on five sequences, Robertson et al. [1] 
only found I.A in this region.
Geographical signal in the sequences
The most predominant genomic region in the database 
was a region of 100 nt at the VP1/2A region (positions 
3,046–3,146 compared with NC_001489) (Figure 1).
A multiple alignment was made with all 3,187 
sequences covering this genomic region, for which an 
endemic country was reported as the possible origin 
of the virus. A set of 63 sequences was excluded due 
to unreliable alignment in the selected genomic region.
This resulted in a subset of 3,124 sequences (32% of 
the downloaded dataset) from 92 of 96 endemic coun-
tries present in the database (95%), for the analysis of 
geographical signal (Figure 2).
On the basis of 100% identity within this 100 nt region, 
2,461 sequences (79% of the subset of sequences 
included in the analysis) were assigned to 181 
sequence-type groups of three or more sequences, 
2,358 of which were significantly associated with this 
group.
Of these, 122 (67%) sequence-type groups contained 
sequences from a single country. Of the 59 sequence 
types from more than one country, 23 came from coun-
tries within the same GBD world region. Seventy four 
countries (75% of all endemic countries represented 
in the database) were significantly associated with at 
least one of the sequence types. The 22 countries with-
out significant association to a sequence type were all 
present in the dataset with only one or two sequences 
(data not shown).
Of the 663 sequences (21%) which were not part of a 
sequence-type group with more than two members, 
477 sequence types were unique, and 186 had two 
representatives.
Table 2
Reported source of hepatitis A in HAVNet reports, 2000–2017 (n = 972)
Possible source of infection Number of reports
Contact with hepatitis A patient 241
Contact with traveller with hepatitis A 5
Homeless/PWID 13
MSM 115
Travel to endemic country 508
Food-borne: fresh or frozen soft fruit 18
Food-borne: shellfish 16
Food-borne: other/unknown 43
Waterborne 2
Other 11
Total 972
HAV: hepatitis A virus; HAVNet: hepatitis A virus Network; MSM: men who have sex with men; PWID: people who inject drugs.
Table 3
Human hepatitis A virus genotypes in the dataset of Robertson et al. compared with the HAVNet and GenBank datasets
HAV genotype
Dataset
Robertson et al. [1] GenBank HAVNet
n Ratio (%) n Ratio (%) n Ratio (%)
I.A 71 68.9 3,924 62.7 1,339 55.9
I.B 12 11.7 1,084 17.3 780 32.6
II 1 1.0 30 0.5 4 0.2
III.A 13 12.6 1,201 19.2 271 11.3
III.B 6 5.8 24 0.4 0 0.0
Total 103 100 6,263 100 2,394 100
HAV: hepatitis A virus; HAVNet: hepatitis A virus Network.
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There were 118 sequence-type groups of genotype I.A, 
46 of I.B, 1 of II.B and 17 of III.A (Table 4). The III.A 
groups were more often composed of more than one 
country, despite their smaller average size. 
Discussion
Analysis of the current global dataset of sequence data 
for HAV shows that the HAVNet database is promising 
for source tracking; however, improvements in data 
quality are necessary to cover gaps regarding essen-
tial metadata and to enable optimal and timely use 
of such data in outbreak studies. In many reports, 
essential metadata are missing. In addition, parts of 
the world are well-covered with respect to reports and 
sequences, while other parts of the world are missing. 
When available, comparison of sequences is compli-
cated by different genomic regions targeted for the 
sequences that are shared.
With the current lag times for reporting, the database 
is able to serve as an outbreak detection tool for frozen 
foods with long shelf lives. For fresh produce, however, 
timeliness requires improvement, as, combined with 
the long incubation period for HAV, it is outside the 
actionable range.
Nevertheless, despite its present sub-optimal form, the 
HAVNet database has illustrated its use for overcom-
ing public health issues in HAV source tracing. The data 
collected within the network supported the detection 
and source-tracing of several international outbreaks, 
food-borne as well as a recent large outbreak among 
MSM [11,14,25-28].
Using the current HAVNet dataset, both the ratio of 
the different genotypes and the worldwide distribution 
of the different genotypes are largely very similar to 
the findings of the 1992 inventory [1]. Only genotype 
III.B is relatively underrepresented in the current data-
set compared with the historic overview, and all III.B 
sequences in the database were several decades old. 
This may reflect a true decrease in global presence, 
as this genotype was strongly associated with Japan, 
which has seen a rapid decline in HAV prevalence [29]. 
As this country now has the lowest endemicity level, 
this genotype seems to have disappeared [5].
The lack of standardisation of partial genome sequenc-
ing precluded integral analysis of this data. Concessions 
had to be made with regard to the length of the included 
genomic region, which resulted in using only a fraction 
of the genetic information in the sequences. Still, our 
analyses did find a distinctive geographic signal in 
the 3,124 included sequences at the level of individual 
countries or GBD regions. In order to be able to vali-
date this with a larger genomic region, the next step 
should be an international harmonisation of sequenc-
ing protocols, thereby building a well-annotated set of 
reference sequences of sufficient length. Here, the use 
of complete genomes, as has been advocated for track-
ing of other pathogens [30-35], would be optimal, but 
due to the higher sequencing costs it is not yet realistic 
for all laboratories. Such a reference set could be used 
to build a second analysis step in the HAV typing tool 
after the genotyping, where geographical annotation 
could be performed, as an indication of the country or 
region of origin of the strain. Such geotagging would 
help to focus source tracing of a HAV infection, particu-
larly in food-borne outbreaks where imported products 
are involved.
The shift in III.B prevalence shows the importance 
of regular and systematic updating of the reference 
sequence database. Moreover, shifts in endemicity 
and the ever-increasing levels of international travel 
and food trade might challenge the present geographi-
cal distribution of HAV strains and thus the use of the 
database for source tracing in the future.
Another important element is the need for global cover-
age: there are still blank spots on the world map, out-
lined on the basis of the HAVNet dataset, partly due 
to the absence of sequences from these regions, but 
also due to absence of sufficient background data to 
pinpoint the geographical origin of the sequences sub-
mitted. However, a growing number of laboratories are 
contributing sequences to the database, and we hope 
that in the near future these blank areas will be filled 
in, leading to a more complete representation of the 
sequence space of HAV.
Despite its shortcomings, the HAVNet database has 
proved promising in pinpointing the geographical ori-
gin of sources in outbreak investigations.
If the HAVNet database can be further improved, it 
could make use of other sources, or could be used at 
earlier stages of international outbreaks, such as the 
outbreak among MSM in Europe [26]. To optimise pub-
lic health profit, the HAV community is encouraged 
to expand its genome sequencing efforts, in terms of 
genome coverage, metadata provision and timely shar-
ing of information.
Table 4
Hepatitis A virus genotype distribution and composition 
of the sequence-type groups, pre-2010–2017 (n = 2,461 
sequences)
HAV 
genotype
Average 
group size
Number of 
groups
Single 
country 
groups
Multiple 
country 
groups
I.A 15.1 118 83 35
I.B 11. 6 46 31 15
II.A 4.0 1 0 1
III.A 8.5 17 8 9
HAV: hepatitis A virus.
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